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As a means to reduce delays in public works 
implementation, a number of Brazilian states have 
recently reformed their procurement rules allowing 
contractor price proposals to be assessed before the 
technical evaluation of submitted bids is undertaken 
(in a procedure known as inversão das fases). In order 
to evaluate the effects of such reform, this paper adopts 
a difference-in-differences methodology to compare 
the procurement performance of São Paulo state (a 
reformer state) and Minas Gerais’ (a non-reformer state) 
largest water and sewage utility along three efficiency 
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dimensions: (i) procurement process duration; (ii) 
likelihood of complaint resolution litigation; and (iii) 
prices paid to contractors. The analysis finds that the 
reform is associated with a 24 day reduction in the 
duration of procurement processes for large projects 
and a 7 percentage point drop in the likelihood of court 
challenges irrespective of project size. Although both 
effects are economically important, only the latter is 
statistical significant. Finally, the paper finds no evidence 
of an effect of the procurement reform on prices paid. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Timely investment in infrastructure remains a key enabler of Brazilian economic 
growth (Ferreira and Gonçalves, 2005). In practice, however, the execution of public 
works—which are the backbone of infrastructure investment—is a protracted and delay-
prone endeavor in the country (Frischtak, 2008). Among the various stages involved in 
the public works execution chain, one of the most heavily regulated (through federal- and 
state-level laws) is the procurement of construction services. As a result, procurement 
tends to be seen as a unique area of opportunity to drive efficiencies in the infrastructure 
investment cycle through regulation reform. To what extent are procurement rules 
responsible for delays in the implementation of infrastructure projects in Brazil? Is it 
possible to improve the timeliness of Brazilian public investments by changing 
procurement rules? What are the effects of different procurement rules on the prices paid 
to contractors for the delivery of public works? 
 
In order to shed some light on these issues, in this paper we assess the effects of a 
prominent reform to the Brazilian open competitive bidding procurement method for 
public works. Commonly referred to as inversão das fases, or bid assessment stage 
inversion, the reform has recently been implemented in four Brazilian states (and is under 
consideration by Congress at the federal level). The main innovation brought about by 
inversão das fases vis-à-vis the “conventional” Brazilian public works procurement 
method is that it allows bid price proposals to be opened and taken into consideration 
before conducting the bids’ technical evaluation. Such additional information disclosure, 
in principle, should reduce the amount of time spent on the technical evaluation of 
submitted bids, as well as the time spent in legal delays arising from the handling of 
complaints associated with the procurement process. Furthermore, the combination of 
price and technical information as inputs to the bid evaluation process may influence the 
prices paid by government agencies for the construction of works. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the evaluation of a public procurement reform 
utilizing rigorous empirical analysis. Specifically, we study the impact of inversão das 
fases along three dimensions of procurement efficiency: (i) procurement process 
duration; (ii) likelihood of procurement process complaint resolution litigation; and (iii) 
prices paid to contractors.   
 
To do so, we utilize a new dataset describing public works procurement processes 
carried out by the largest (and majority state-owned) water and sewage utilities in two 
Brazilian states—SABESP, of the state of São Paulo, and COPASA, of Minas Gerais—
for the years 2007 and 2009. Since 2008 marks the year in which the state of São Paulo 
reformed the procurement of public works through inversão das fases, we are able to 
evaluate the reform’s impact at SABESP utilizing a difference-in-differences 
methodology relative to COPASA in Minas Gerais, a state where no such reform took 
place. 
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Our empirical analysis shows that, while the adoption of inversão das fases led to a 
24 day reduction in the average duration of the procurement process for large works, such 
effect is not statistically significant. The reform, however, does appear to have reduced 
the likelihood of court challenges, by a statistically-significant 7 percentage points. 
Finally, the reform does not seem to be associated with any significant change in the cost 
of public works to taxpayers, as measured by prices paid to winning contractors.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the Brazilian 
procurement process for public works. In particular, it discusses the process’s virtues and 
shortcomings, and the rationale by which some states have decided to reform it through 
the adoption of inversão das fases. Section 3 briefly discusses the theoretical literature on 
procurement methods, and provides some testable implications on the possible effects of 
inversão das fases on our three efficiency dimensions of interest: procurement process 
duration, incidence of process-triggered legal complaints, and prices paid to contractors. 
Section 4 presents the methodology used to evaluate the procurement reform in São 
Paulo state and further illustrates the data utilized. Section 5 presents the paper’s 
empirical results, while section 6 provides some tentative conclusions and discusses 
possible extensions to the analysis.  
 
 
2.  Government procurement in Brazil: Why it matters 
 
In January 2007, the Brazilian federal government launched an economic stimulus 
package—referred to as Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC), or Growth 
Acceleration Program—that would spend R$504 billion (about $270 billion) over 4 
years, primarily on expanding or updating the country’s infrastructure stock (about 65% 
of planned PAC funds were explicitly allocated to infrastructure projects, with the bulk of 
the balance going to housing finance). Launched well in advance of the onset of the 
global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, the PAC’s primary objective was to 
promote faster long-term growth on an equitable and fiscally responsible basis.  
 
Due to PAC’s magnitude and the political prominence it has mustered, public sector 
efficiency in implementing PAC projects has been closely observed by a broad list of 
stakeholders, from political parties to oversight agencies, government contractors, the 
media, and, of course, the taxpayer. There are two performance indicators that these 
interest groups track with particular care: (i) the program’s infrastructure project 
completion rate; and (ii) the amount spent in completed infrastructure projects as a 
percentage of the program’s overall infrastructure budget. Yet, according to PAC’s own 
progress reports, implementing agencies at various levels of the Brazilian public sector 
have experienced delays—as measured by both of these indicators. Specifically, as of 
April 2010 (just 8 months prior to PAC’s phase-out), a full 43% of planned infrastructure 
projects had not been completed. Moreover, the completed projects at that point in time Page | 4  
 
represented R$144 billion, or merely 34% of the total PAC budget for infrastructure
4 
(Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, 2010).  
 
Most major public works funded by PAC (primarily in transport and energy 
infrastructure) are procured and contracted under Brazilian law through open competitive 
bidding. Since conducting bidding processes of this kind in Brazil is procedurally time 
consuming, it is hardly surprising that over the past three years public procurement has 
received a great deal of attention by stakeholders preoccupied with the timely and 
efficient use of stimulus money. To some of them—including the federal government—
the bottlenecks that have plagued many PAC-originated bidding events are a key reason 
why disbursements and project deliveries have experienced delays. The significance of 
public procurement efficiency in the country has only been amplified by the March 2010 
unveiling of PAC 2, a second and bigger public investment program, which will spend 
R$959 billion (about $512 billion) over 2011-2014. 
 
2.1  The Brazilian process for the procurement of public works 
 
The Brazilian government procurement system is governed by a two-pronged 
regulatory framework. The first prong is that of law 10.520 of 2002 (10.520/02), which 
regulates the procurement of off-the-shelf goods and non-consulting services (the latter 
also exclude construction services). Under this law, goods and non-consulting services 
are to be procured through the reverse auction method, commonly known to Brazilians as 
Pregão.
5 The second prong in the regulatory framework is that of law 8.666 of 1993 
(8.666/93) which, since the 2002 adoption of reverse auctions, has primarily been used 
for the procurement of public works (such as those funded by PAC) and consulting 
services. In the particular case of public works procurement (as opposed to consulting 
services), law 8.666/93 stipulates that project contracts shall be awarded on the basis of 
the lowest offered price among those proposals previously deemed compliant with the 
bidding documents. In order to determine whether a bid complies with the bidding 
documents (referred to as a “responsive bid”), and eventually determine how price-
competitive a responsive bid is, public works procurement, as dictated by law, is to be 
carried out via a sequential “two-envelope” bidding process.    
 
The Brazilian two-envelope procedure for the procurement of public works takes 
place as follows. Having carefully reviewed the bidding documents, which describe in 
                                                 
4 PAC’s total budget was expanded since its inception to R$656.5 billion (as of April 2010), of which 
R$427.8 billion was allocated to infrastructure investments in transport/logistics, energy, and social/urban 
development, with the rest allocated to housing and domestic sewage.  
5 A reverse auction is a procurement mechanism that utilizes the lowest bid price as the critical award 
criterion. During the auction, bidders compete for the right to sell a given item to one or more contracting 
agencies by offering decreasing prices through successive, dynamic bidding, and for a pre-specified period 
of bidding time (say, 1 hour). When the bidding time expires, the winning bidder is the one that offered the 
lowest price—provided that, upon subsequent inspection, the item(s) and terms offered by the bidder are 
substantially responsive to the requirements set forth in the bidding documents. In Brazil, the vast majority 
of reverse auction events are carried out online (for example, in 2009, 97% of Federal Government reverse 
auctions took place over the internet). 
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detail the project in question (including, for example, engineering designs), interested 
contractors submit their bids in two separate envelopes. The first envelope contains the 
bidder’s legal, fiscal, technical, and financial qualification documents. Such qualification 
documents are meant to certify that the contractor is (i) legally eligible to win the 
contract, and (ii) able (technically and financially) to successfully execute it (per the 
detailed engineering design and estimated construction costs provided in the bidding 
documents). The second envelope solely contains the contractor’s price proposal.  
 
After receiving paired sealed envelopes from all bidders, a technical committee 
appointed by the implementing agency (say, a federal- or state-government ministry) 
evaluates the bids in two stages. In the first stage, only the envelopes containing the 
qualification documents are opened and their contents assessed in order to determine 
which bidders are qualified to execute the contract (in strict accordance with bidding 
document criteria). This assessment is conducted for all bids received, regardless of what 
the corresponding price envelope might contain. Since reviewing bidder qualifications 
(particularly the technical component) can be a highly specialized (and therefore time 
consuming) task, the need to review all proposals may result in time bottlenecks.  
 
Bidders deemed not in compliance with the bidding documents are disqualified at the 
first stage and their price envelopes returned unopened. In effect, the first stage acts like a 
filter through which only qualified bidders will advance to the second stage, where award 
decisions are made. It is in this sense that the two-envelope mechanism is sometimes 
referred to as a pre-qualification procurement method. During the second stage, the price 
envelopes of qualified bidders are opened, and the qualified bidder that submitted the 
lowest price proposal is awarded the contract. 
 
2.2  Distinction between evaluating project quality and evaluating bidders’ 
qualifications 
 
In order to correctly assess the efficiency of the Brazilian two-stage procurement 
procedure for public works as defined by law 8.666/93, it is important to emphasize that 
its objective is to award a given contract to the qualified bidder that offers the lowest 
price. In this context, being a “qualified” bidder means, as mentioned earlier, being “able 
to execute” a given (i.e., pre-defined, per detailed engineering designs) project. Since a 
bidder can only be deemed either able or unable to execute a project, qualification 
decisions are strictly made on a pass/fail basis. 
 
A project’s intrinsic characteristics—such as its physical layout, the materials with 
which it is built, the layers of reinforcement that it calls for, the project’s location—
encompass what is defined as the project’s “quality” dimension. These are critical, since 
they define how the project will ultimately fulfill the service delivery needs that led to its 
creation in the first place. However, such characteristics are not the object of assessment 
in the two-envelope procedure for the construction of public works that this paper is 
concerned with. Such characteristics are defined by a project’s engineering design and Page | 6  
 
estimated costs, which are an input to—not a result of—the two-envelope competitive 
bidding process for the procurement of public works construction.
6 
 
2.3  Complaint resolution mechanisms in the procurement of public works 
 
According to Brazil’s Constitution, all government documents must be made publicly 
available, including those used for government procurement. Therefore, any bidder—in 
fact, any citizen—is allowed to inspect each and every bid received by the contracting 
agency during the bid opening ceremony. Equipped with that knowledge, bidders in 
disagreement with first-stage evaluation decisions may file complaints, either to have 
their bids reinstated for the second stage or to request the rejection of someone else’s bid.  
 
Interested bidders have three readily available channels to voice complaints: (i) an 
administrative channel, implemented by the agency carrying out the procurement 
process; (ii) the nation’s Supreme Auditor (known as Tribunal de Contas da União, or 
TCU), which reports to the Legislative branch of power; and (iii) the country’s regular 
courts of law.  
 
Even though a formal administrative complaint resolution channel is provided in the 
procurement law, the process in practice is perceived as ineffective with regard to settling 
complaints definitively (as it is carried out by the very agency whose decision originated 
the complaint). As a result, unsatisfied bidders tend to either file directly with the courts 
to settle complaints, or do so after utilizing the administrative complaint resolution 
process as a matter of course.  
 
In recent years, the number of complaints filed with TCU has risen considerably, to a 
point where TCU-filed complaints may now outnumber the cases referred to courts of 
law. A primary reason for TCU’s popularity is that, according to clause 113 of law 
8.666/93, any citizen can refer a case to TCU to be reviewed free of charge, whereas 
regular lawsuits involve potentially costly legal fees. Moreover, even after an unfavorable 
decision by TCU, bidders can still file a lawsuit at regular courts if they remain 
unsatisfied. 
 
Importantly from a time bottleneck perspective, neither TCU nor the courts of law are 
bound by decision-making timeframes. Whenever a complaint is filed for review with 
these entities, procurement processes are interrupted for unspecified periods of time 
(several-month long reviews are not uncommon). As a result, the large number of 
lawsuits that exists in practice leads to potentially long delays in the conduction of 
procurement events. In addition, the fact that TCU reviews complaints at no charge to the 
                                                 
6 There are cases in which the design and construction of works are bundled into a single procurement 
process, in a procedure known as “design and build.” In Brazil, the design and build approach is mainly 
used for awarding large concession contracts (e.g., for power plants). Design and build, however, 
represents but a fraction of procurement transactions; most transactions follow the more traditional two-
step approach of preparing designs first (whether in-house or on a contractual basis) and subsequently 
launching a bid solely for the construction stage. Design and build contracts are not analyzed in this paper. 
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complainant has proven to be an incentive for frivolous (i.e., otherwise avoidable) 
complaints. 
 
2.4  The concept of inversão das fases 
 
As noted earlier, reviewing all technical proposals in the first stage of the evaluation 
process—particularly for large scale, complex public works—is time- and resource-
consuming. Such an evaluation procedure is especially onerous if one takes into account 
that the ultimate award criterion under which contractors are compared is their offered 
price (in other words, submitting a responsive bid is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for award). It then follows that if price proposals were known upfront, only 
bids that are competitive on price (say, the three lowest) could initially undergo (the 
resource-intensive) technical evaluation, while high bids, which holding everything else 
constant would have little chance of winning the contract, could be safely ignored. 
Opening the price proposal envelopes upfront could therefore shorten the bid evaluation 
period (and thus make works procurement more cost-effective).  
 
But the technical evaluation is not the only time- and resource-intensive activity that 
takes place in the pre-qualification bidding process: complaint resolution also plays a 
role. When prices are known only after the qualification documents are reviewed, 
procurement processes are particularly prone to legal complaints during the first stage—
especially frivolous ones—since first-stage rejected bidders do not know how likely they 
are, if reinstated, to eventually win the award. Conversely, if price proposals were opened 
first, only bidders with a real chance of winning (i.e., only price-competitive bidders) 
would have incentives to file a (potentially costly and protracted) complaint. Were it in 
fact to lead to fewer complaints per procurement process, switching the order in which 
bid envelopes are opened could result in shorter (and cheaper) legal delays and therefore 
shorter (and more resource-efficient) overall procurement processes.   
 
As it turns out, the potentially costly time and administrative resource impact of using 
pre-qualification in public works procurement is becoming increasingly apparent to 
Brazilian authorities at all levels of government. To many of them, the (highly resource-
efficient and internationally emulated) reverse auction mechanism for the procurement of 
off-the-shelf goods has over the past eight years provided tangible evidence of the 
benefits of opening a bid evaluation process with prices rather than with qualification 
documents, as is the practice under Pregão.  
 
As a result, several states—including such investment powerhouses as São Paulo—
have modified their public works procurement laws to allow for switching the bid 
evaluation stages, in a procedure known as inversão das fases (which literally translates 
as “phase inversion”). Such a method provides the legal basis for (i) opening and 
assessing the contents of price envelopes before evaluating qualification documents; and 
(ii) conducting technical reviews of only those bids that are price-competitive (typically, 
it is the three lowest bids that are automatically evaluated, leaving the fourth and 
subsequent bids to be evaluated if, and only if, the three lowest bids are substantially 
unresponsive to the bidding documents). Because under inversão das fases technical Page | 8  
 
evaluations are conducted after price proposals have been compared, the mechanism can 
be defined as a post-qualification procurement procedure. Besides São Paulo, which 
passed inversão das fases legislation in 2008, the sate administrations of Bahia (2005), 
Sergipe (2006), and Paraná (2007) have all enacted sub-national laws allowing phase 
inversion in the context of public works procurement.  
 
Notwithstanding the successful passage of these reforms at the sub-national level, 
phase inversion in the procurement of public works remains a highly controversial issue 
in Brazil. Specifically, the topic has galvanized government officials on one side (arguing 
for faster and more efficient works procurement implementation) and large contractors on 
the other (claiming that phase inversion may result in awarding contracts to unqualified 
bidders, with potentially risky consequences). Those against phase inversion assert that 
less qualified contractors could deliver low-quality construction, request amendments to 
the contract price during project execution (having originally secured the contract by 
offering the lowest price), or altogether default on a contract mid-execution. This paper 
will try to shed light on the first of these opposing positions. Namely, is phase inversion 
really associated with faster (and therefore more efficient) works procurement 
implementation? 
 
2.5  The role of prices paid 
 
Aside from its impact on the duration (and therefore on time-driven costs) of public 
works procurement processes (both from a bid evaluation and from a complaint-
resolution standpoint), inversão das fases may impact procurement efficiency through a 
second dimension: the use of taxpayer money in the form of prices paid to contractors.  
 
All phase inversion laws that have been enacted by state legislatures have a provision 
known as fase saneadora, or “cleanup phase.” The role of the cleanup phase is to legally 
allow bid evaluation committees to either seek clarification on, or altogether waive, 
small, non-material deviations—vis-à-vis the bidding documents—in the qualification 
documents of price-competitive and otherwise responsive bids. In that way, a competitive 
bid (say, the lowest offered price) can be “cleaned up” of non-material deviations (say, 
lack of page numbering, or a missing, but retrievable, financial statement) that otherwise 
would have either triggered an outright rejection by the evaluation committee or 
significantly increased the likelihood of legal (and potentially binding) complaints by  
competing bidders.  
 
The federal public procurement law (8.666/93) does not provide for a fase saneadora. 
As a result, the approach taken in practice by bid evaluators is overly legalistic, by which 
any deviation from the requirements set forth in the bidding document—material or 
otherwise—will likely result in outright bid rejection. From a prices paid perspective, the 
lack of a cleanup phase may lead to highly competitive (i.e., comparatively price-
attractive) bids being rejected for non-material deviations—without the evaluation 
committee ever knowing of the competitive nature of the rejected bids (as price 
envelopes are returned unopened after a first-stage rejection).  
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The presence of a fase saneadora in the practice of phase inversion can thus 
potentially lead to lower prices paid by implementing agencies (relative to those that 
would have been attained without switching the order of the evaluation stages) on the 
basis legally more flexible (due to the cleanup phase) decisions made by evaluation 
committees. On the other hand, the potential for lower prices paid created by these two 
procedural tools can in practice be partially or entirely offset by post-award contract 
amendments, which may be negotiated by a successful “low-ball” bidder during project 
execution.  
 
But even taking only the initial award price into account, the absolute magnitude of 
the savings in contractor fees that might result from practicing phase inversion to award a 
given project is likely to be small. This is due to homogeneity in the cost structure among 
contractors, especially those within a state, as well as the fact that contractor bids are 
prepared with full knowledge of the implementing agency’s estimated project cost (which 
tends to be highly accurate). Both of these elements constrain the variability in price 
proposals for a given project.  
 
Still, added across thousands of procurement processes in (currently) four states—
particularly during the implementation of a large, infrastructure-oriented stimulus 
package—overall savings to the taxpayer associated with prices paid under phase 
inversion could be substantial.  
 
Nevertheless, no effort has yet been made in the literature to measure the presence 
and magnitude of a potential phase inversion impact on prices paid. This paper will 
attempt to do that, as explained in subsequent sections.   
  
2.6  Potential implications for different bidder invitation procedures under 
inversão das fases  
 
The more time- and resource-consuming it is to assess the qualifications of a group of 
bidders vying for a particular public works contract, the bigger the impact inversão das 
fases is likely to have on both the overall duration of the procurement process and the 
number and duration of legal complaints associated with it. Procurement process time- 
and resource-intensiveness, in practice, tend to be closely associated with a project’s 
price tag: large packages (say, the construction of a bridge or a water plant) are typically 
more resource intensive, from a procurement perspective, than smaller packages (say, a 
small rural road project). The primary reason for this is that larger projects carry higher 
complexity in assessing bidder qualifications, as well as higher financial and engineering 
risk.    
 
Under law 8.666/93, even though the two-envelope bid evaluation mechanism applies 
to the procurement of all public works, regardless of their size, a procedure’s openness to 
competition does depend on size (specifically, on the estimated contract size, which 
implementing agencies must provide to bidders as an input to bid preparation). For public 
works with an estimated contract size of up to R$150,000 (about $90,000), public 
agencies can use an invitation procedure known as convite, or limited bidding, for which Page | 10  
 
the direct invitation of at least 3 interested bidders (whether or not they are registered in 
the official list of government suppliers) is enough for launching the bidding process.
7 
For works above R$150,000 and up to R$1.5 million, public agencies must utilize an 
invitation procedure known as tomada de preços, or price inquiry, where the bidding 
process is open to an unlimited number of interested bidders, provided they are properly 
registered in the official list of government contractors.
8 Finally, all public works with an 
estimated contract size above R$1.5 million must be tendered under an invitation 
procedure called concorrência, or fully-open bidding, where any bidder, registered or 
not, can participate.
9     
    
Because projects under tomada de preços (TP) are smaller in contract size relative to 
those under concorrência and because, as suggested above, larger-sized projects tend to 
be more procurement resource intensive, it is for concorrência procurement processes for 
which inversão das fases would likely have the bigger efficiency impact. However, no 
factual evidence exists to date to corroborate the existence of such a differentiated 
inversão das fases impact across tender invitation procedures.  
 
 
3.  Some theoretical considerations and testable implications 
 
The foundations of modern auction theory were laid by Vickrey (1961), in his 
seminal paper on Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Other 
milestones in the literature are Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson’s (1981) papers 
on optimal auctions and the revenue equivalence theorem, and the paper by Milgrom and 
Weber (1982) on auctions with affiliated valuations. Krishna (2002) gives an excellent 
overview of the very extensive theoretical literature, while the book by Milgrom (2004) 
takes a more applied approach and considers practical issues in auction design.   
 
In standard auctions, the principal is a monopolistic seller who only cares about the 
price he obtains in the auction. In a procurement auction, on the other hand, the principal 
is a monopsonistic buyer of goods and services who cares both about price and quality. In 
such an environment, bids are necessarily multidimensional in nature. The existing 
literature on auctions with multidimensional bids is more limited. Some references are 
Che (1993), Zheng (2000), and Asker and Cantillon (2008). The common approach in 
these papers is to study bidding under various “scoring rules” which assign scores to each 
aspect of a multidimensional bid that are then added up to determine the winner of the 
auction.  
 
                                                 
7 The procedure is still considered open competitive bidding, since uninvited bidders may themselves 
request participation in a convite event up to 24 hours prior to the deadline for bid submission. 
8 Non-registered suppliers interested in a tomada de preços event may request registration up to 3 days 
prior to the event’s bid submission deadline.  
9 Besides limits on the number of bidders invited and restrictions regarding official registration, these three 
invitation procedures may also differ in terms of the broadness with which they are advertised (for 
example, in a newspaper of local circulation versus a newspaper of national circulation, the official gazette, 
and/or online government procurement portals).  Page | 11  
 
Public works procurement systems in Brazil (both in the case of pre- and post-
qualification) could be modeled as a scoring auction in which the auctioneer cares about 
both quality and prices. As appealing as it can be from a theoretical perspective, such 
specification, however, would not reflect well the Brazilian system in which the 
qualification criteria are set by law. Thus, in our “quasi formal” analysis we model the 
Brazilian public works procurement system as a first-price sealed bid auction with 
minimum quality standards. We think that this is a better characterization of the system, 
despite the fact that it might not be an optimal choice. Indeed, it is well-known (Che, 
1993) that scoring auctions that use the auctioneer’s actual preferences are better than 
price-only auctions with minimum quality standards.  
 
In what follows, we describe a simple set-up that can shed some light on the effect of 
pre- versus post-qualification. Since the arguments we develop to compare the different 
types of auctions are straightforward and the equivalence results follow directly from 
Riley and Samuelson (1981) or Milgrom and Weber (1981), we opted to proceed in an 
informal way. 
 
3.1 Sketch of a model 
 
In order to “model” inversão das fases, we assume that bidders (participating in a first 
price sealed bid auction to supply some kind of good to the government) differ in two 
dimensions: (i) whether or not they are qualified to produce the good; and (ii) the cost 
they face in producing it.  
 
We further assume that, before bidding, each bidder gets to observe her own cost but 
not whether or not she is qualified; and that if the winning bidder is unqualified, the good 
produced (and paid for) is worthless to the government. 
  
Under pre-qualification, the agency first chooses which bidders qualify observing a 
signal of their type. Then, in the second stage, it is committed to awarding the project to 
the lowest bid among the qualified bidders. Under post-qualification, the agency first 
ranks the bidders by price from low to high and, initially, only assesses whether the 
lowest bidder qualifies. If she does, the project is awarded to her and the auction ends. 
Else, the agency moves to the second-lowest bid. This in turn implies that:  
 
Result 1: The expected number of evaluations that the implementing agency needs to 
undertake under post-qualification is smaller than under pre-qualification. 
 
Bidders can challenge in court any decision taken by the agency. If a decision as to 
(dis)qualify a bidder is challenged, the court gets to observe the type and, if warranted, 
overrules the agency. Note that, if the cost of suing is sufficiently low (which indeed 
seems to be the case in Brazil as appealing to the court of auditors is free), then each and 
every decision taken by the agency will be challenged in court.  
 
This in turn implies that under pre-qualification the agency takes a decision as to the 
qualification of every bid. When the costs of suing are sufficiently small, every decision Page | 12  
 
will be challenged in court: not only bidders who have been disqualified will challenge 
their disqualification, but bidders who have been qualified have an incentive to challenge 
the qualification of every other bidder who has also been qualified, in the hope of 
reducing the number of competitors. Under post-qualification, instead, there is a strictly 
positive probability that the court decides that the lowest bidder is qualified, and if this is 
the case only one lawsuit takes place. We thus have that: 
 
Result 2: When the costs of suing are sufficiently low, the expected number of 
lawsuits under post-qualification is strictly smaller than under pre-qualification. 
 
Looking at the bidding profiles, it is important to notice that under both pre- and post-
qualification a bidder wins the auction if and only if she offers the lowest bid among all 
qualified bids. Since, under both systems, all of the agency’s qualification decisions are 
challenged in court and the court perfectly observes the qualifications of each bidder, the 
probability of winning remains unchanged, for every strategy profile. As a bidder’s 
payoff is fully determined by the probability of winning the auction, and the profit 
conditional on winning, pre- and post-qualification are strategically equivalent and, 
hence, a bidding profile is an equilibrium under pre-qualification if and only if it is an 
equilibrium under post-qualification. Accordingly, 
 
Result 3: If the bidders’ costs (and the likelihood of bids being accepted) under pre- 
and post-qualification are the same, then a bidding profile is an equilibrium under pre-
qualification if, and only if, it is an equilibrium under post-qualification. 
 
Finally, consider the case in which—for instance, as a consequence of the 
introduction of the fase saneadora—in the post-qualification system the likelihood that a 
bid (of a given qualification responsiveness) is accepted is higher than in the pre-
qualification system. This would in turn imply that, for any given bidding strategy, the 
probability of winning (conditional upon the bid being accepted) is lower and bidding is 
more aggressive under post-qualification than under pre-qualification. Notice that this 
effect would be further magnified if the probability that a bid is accepted depends 
(negatively) upon the price offered. We thus have that: 
  
Result 4: If in the post-qualification system the likelihood that a bid (of a given 
qualification responsiveness) is accepted as responsive is higher than in the pre-
qualification system, then the equilibrium prices are lower under the post-qualification 
system than under the pre-qualification system. 
 
Notice that Propositions 1 and 2 trivially imply the following testable implication:  
 
Testable Implication 1:  The procurement process should be faster under post-
qualification than under pre-qualification; 
 
Moreover, Proposition 3 and 4 imply that:  
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Testable Implication 2: One should not expect a significant difference in prices 
paid between pre- and post-qualification rules, unless under the latter system it is more 
likely that (competitive) bids qualify. 
 
In what follows we evaluate whether these testable implications hold true in our 
analysis of the effects of shifting from pre- to post-qualification in the practice of works 
procurement in Brazil. 
 
 
4.       Methodology 
 
We assess the impact of inversão das fases on three procurement outcomes: (i) 
average duration of a procurement process for public works; (ii) likelihood that one or 
more complaints are filed during a procurement process; and (iii) prices paid to 
contractors, as measured by the average size of awarded contracts. To do so, we adopt a 
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, wherein changes in outcomes for a contracting 
entity located in a reforming state—São Paulo’s SABESP—pre- relative to post-reform 
are compared to those of a contracting entity located in a non-reforming state—Minas 
Gerais’ COPASA. In essence, COPASA serves as a control entity, such that its trend in 
outcomes pre- and post-reform is differenced out of the trend observed at SABESP, the 
treatment entity. Since São Paulo’s phase inversion law was enacted in 2008, we use 
procurement processes conducted in 2007 as our pre-reform sample, and processes 
conducted in 2009 as our post-reform sample. 
 
4.1 Description and justification of the DD approach 
 
Formally, we estimate models of the following form: 
 
  st st t s t s st Y SP Y SP Y              X Π 2009 2009     [ 1 ]  
 
where  Yst is the outcome—either process duration (measured as the time, in days, 
between the opening of the first envelope and the granting of the award), complaint 
incidence, or award size—in state s in year t; SPs is an indicator for whether the project 
takes places in the treatment state, São Paulo; Y2009t is an indicator for whether the 
project takes place in 2009 (i.e., post-reform); and Xst is a vector of project 
characteristics, such as an indicator for the procurement process invitation mechanism 
(tomada de preços or concorrência), month of the year, and project type fixed effects. All 
reais-denominated quantities are deflated to January 2007 reais by the Brazilian 
construction price index. 
 
The parameter β captures any permanent differences in outcomes between São Paulo 
and Minas Gerais. For instance, β includes any differences in the nature of public works 
or “productivity” levels at SABESP relative to COPASA. In turn, γ embodies the trend in 
outcomes between 2007 and 2009 that is common to both entities. In turn, δ—the 
difference-in-differences parameter of interest—measures the change in outcome at 
SABESP from pre- to post-reform above and beyond that observed at COPASA, net of Page | 14  
 
changes that are correlated with project characteristics. With rich enough Xst, and 
assuming that systematic differences across the two states remain fixed from 2007 to 
2009, ordinary least squares estimation of [1] will deliver causal estimates of the reform’s 
impact on works procurement outcomes. 
 
4.2 Data description 
 
As mentioned throughout the paper, we utilize works procurement data from two 
water and sewage utilities operating in Brazil: SABESP, a company that serves most of 
the São Paulo state market, and COPASA, the largest water utility in the state of Minas 
Gerais. 
 
SABESP and COPASA are similar water and sewage operators in many respects. 
Both companies are publicly traded and majority state-owned (and therefore subject to 
public procurement laws). Each provides water to at least 10 million people and had 2009 
revenues in excess of $1 billion.
10 Importantly from a works procurement perspective, 
both companies have announced sizable capital expenditures for the next several years. 
For 2009-2010 alone, the combined capital expenditures of both companies will stand at 
about $3 billion ($2 billion by SABESP, $1 billion by COPASA). They also operate in 
similar business and socioeconomic environments within their states, as São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais (a) have consistently ranked among the 10 Brazilian states with the highest 
per capita income over the past several years, and (b) register a Human Development 
Index score, as measured by the UN, that is markedly higher than the national average. 
 
The data gathered comprise the full universe of procurement processes for works 
carried out by each company in 2007 and 2009 under both the tomada de preços and 
concorrência invitation mechanisms (i.e., the largest projects by size).  For each bidding 
process, we observe data on the type of work being bid on (which makes possible 
segregating projects by their nature or segment), the duration (in days) of the bidding 
process (from the opening of the first envelope to the award of contract), the presence (if 
any) and duration (in days) of legal complaints filed by bidders during the bidding 
process, the estimated project cost (in R$) provided by each company to the bidders 
during the bid preparation period, and the actual contract amount (in R$), which is the 
end result of the procurement process. Note that the period of study purposely excludes 
2008, as this was the year that São Paulo state introduced sub-national legislation 
allowing phase inversion for the procurement of works.  
 
More specifically, data collected from SABESP are organized in two separate 
datasets: the first describing all bidding processes, the second containing data specifically 
related to those processes impacted by procurement complaints. Table 1 describes the 
fields contained in each SABESP dataset. For COPASA, a single dataset was collected, 
whose detailed contents are described in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
10 Specifically, SABESP provides water to 24 million people and generated 2009 revenues of $4.6 billion; 
COPASA serves a population of some 13 million, with 2009 revenues of $1.2 billion. Page | 15  
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the outcomes of interest, broken down by 
company/state and year. In both 2007 and 2009, COPASA conducted almost twice as 
many procurement processes for works under TPs and concorrências as SABESP. The 
average duration of a procurement process at SABESP went from 85 days in 2007 to 68 
days in 2009, while similar numbers at COPASA went from 37 to 32 days.  In 2007, the 
likelihood of a complaint being filed for a particular project at SABESP (16%) was 75% 
higher than that observed at COPASA (9%). In 2009, however, the incidence of litigation 
was virtually the same between the companies, with a slightly lower likelihood of 
complaints at SABESP (13%) than at COPASA (15%). COPASA projects were roughly 
60% the size of their SABESP counterparts in 2007, as measured by the median contract 
award size. The ratio falls to 41% in 2009.  
 
 
5.        Empirical analysis: Results 
 
5.1  Results 
 
As a first pass, unadjusted estimates of δ in equation [1] can be constructed for all 3 
outcomes of interest from the figures in Table 3. For the mean duration of a procurement 
process (in days), the unadjusted D-in-D estimate of the effect of reform is (68.27 – 
85.15) – (31.95 – 37.19) = -11.64. According to this result, inversão das fases was 
associated with a 12 day reduction in the average duration of a SABESP procurement 
process for works. Analogous calculations suggest inversão das fases is associated with a 
reduction in complaint incidence of about 9 percentage points and a reduction in contract 
award size of about R$7.3 million. 
  
5.1.1 Adjusted impact on procurement process duration 
 
As laid out in the sketch of the model, the theory provides one sharp prediction: that 
the procurement process should be faster under post-qualification (i.e., under inversão 
das fases) than under pre-qualification. We test this prediction by studying the number of 
elapsed days between the opening of the first envelope and the signing of the award. As 
mentioned above, an unadjusted benchmark estimate of the effect of inversão das fases 
(based on Table 3) on procurement process duration is that it indeed sped up the average 
process by about 12 days.
11 
 
Table 4 reports estimates of δ, β, and γ in equation [1], as well as the estimated 
coefficients of several other controls (standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of 
unspecified form). The first column ([a]) of the upper panel provides estimates for a 
model that controls only for seasonal indicators and procurement event type 
(concorrência or TP). The model suggests that at baseline SABESP’s projects lasted on 
average 42 days longer than COPASA’s. It also suggests that the reform reduced event 
                                                 
11 We also estimated parametric duration models. While we noticed a gain in efficiency, the point estimates 
were sensitive to the underlying parametric assumption, highlighting the relevance of the robustness-
efficiency tradeoff. Hence, we opted to report only OLS results, which are statistically conservative and 
robust estimates, imposing minimal assumptions on unobservables. Page | 16  
 
durations by about 13 days, consistent with theory (although only the difference at 
baseline is statistically significant at conventional levels). It is possible, however, that 
such reduction arises from smaller-scale projects going up for bid at SABESP in 2009 
relative to 2007. This possibility is explored in column [b], where we additionally control 
for each company’s estimated costs for projects. Controlling for the company’s 
“reservation price,” which carries information about project scale and scope, indeed 
reduces the differences reported in column [a].  
 
Even this (statistically insignificant) gain in process speed may be overstated if 
complaints on average lengthen durations and post-qualification generates fewer bidder 
complaints (which we test below). Column [c] therefore reports results of specifications 
that add an indicator of whether any litigation was pursued. These suggest that the reform 
increased delays by one statistically insignificant day and that, on average, litigated (i.e., 
complaint-delayed) events are 47 days longer (which is statistically distinguishable from 
zero at the 1% level).  
 
One concern regarding these estimates is that the composition of company-specific 
projects may have changed in either firm from 2007 to 2009, which may confound the 
effects of the reform. In the lower panel of Table 4, we address this concern by 
controlling for the general category of projects, adding indicators for project segment. 
However, all conclusions are qualitatively unchanged, with point estimates remaining 
relatively stable from the top to the bottom panel, suggesting that composition effects do 
not appear to confound the conclusions. 
 
In sum, there is no evidence that inversão das fases sped up the process when we look 
at the full universe of projects (that is, including concorrências and TPs). Such a result is 
consistent with our original conjecture that the phase inversion impact on process 
duration is not likely to be significant when smaller-sized (and therefore less complex) 
TP projects are included in the analysis. As will be shown later in detail, when restricting 
the sample to concorrência-only projects, the reform is associated with a 30% drop in the 
duration of the procurement process. While economically significant, the effect is not 
statistically significant—possibly due to limited sample size (there are 223 large scale 
projects in our sample). 
 
  5.1.2 Adjusted impact on the likelihood of complaints 
 
We then test the proposition that the likelihood of lawsuits or complaints under post-
qualification is smaller than that under pre-qualification, as hypothesized above. We 
estimate probit versions of equation [1], where the outcome is an indicator for whether a 
complaint was filed, and report average marginal effects in Table 5. Although there is no 
statistically discernible difference in the incidence of complaints between the two 
companies after controlling for covariates and estimated project costs, the table’s lower 
panel (which includes segment fixed effects) suggests that litigation is approximately 7 
percentage points less prevalent post-reform. This figure is both statistically (at the 5% 
level) and economically significant, since 13% of projects in our sample are the subject 
of litigation. Page | 17  
 
 
  5.1.3 Adjusted impact on prices paid 
 
We end this section by estimating versions of equation [1] where the award size (in 
real terms) is the outcome. Table 6 reports estimates of δ, β, and γ. The upper panel of 
column ([a]) indicates that, at baseline, SABESP’s projects were on average R$7 million 
costlier (i.e., carried a larger award size by that amount) than those at COPASA. The 
project cost gap was reversed by the reform, which was associated with a R$7.6 million 
reduction in award size (both numbers are statistically significant at conventional levels). 
However, column [b], which controls for each company’s a priori estimated project costs, 
illustrates that this reduction resulted from smaller scale projects put up for bid at 
SABESP in 2009 relative to 2007: holding constant each company’s estimated project 
costs eliminates the statistically significant difference in award size reported in column 
[a].
12 To confirm that the scale of projects changed at SABESP between 2007 and 2009, 
we estimate the D-in-D model on the estimated project costs and report estimates in 
column [e]. According to this specification, the SABESP-COPASA gap in project 
budgets at baseline (which averaged +R$8.5 million), was entirely closed in 2009, as 
hypothesized.  
 
In column [c], we additionally control for whether a complaint was filed over the 
procurement process. Doing so barely alters the estimates from column [b], though the 
point estimate on the dummy indicating the presence of one or more complaints implies 
that such projects are associated with roughly R$ 0.6 million lower estimated costs.  
 
Finally, in column [d] we explore the possibility of a structural break in the 
relationship between actual and estimated costs, by controlling for the interaction of the 
2009 year indicator and the estimated cost. No such structural break is observed. 
 
As mentioned above, the possibility of company-specific projects to change segment 
composition from 2007 to 2009 may confound the effects of the reform. In the lower 
panel of Table 6 we therefore control for the general characteristics of projects by adding 
indicators for project segment. However, this hardly alters conclusions or point estimates 
relative to the top panel, suggesting that the composition of projects, as embodied by 
these indicators, did not change materially between 2007 and 2009 for both SABESP and 
COPASA. 
 
As a robustness check, and to explore the possibility that the zero effect at the mean 
does not mask heterogeneity in the reform’s effect elsewhere on the conditional 






th centiles of project costs. The idea being that effects that 
go undetected at the mean may still be observed if the reform either compressed or 
flattened the conditional distribution of the outcome. The quantile regression estimates 
are reported in Table 7 and show little effect at any of the conditional quantiles, even at 
the 10% level. 
                                                 
12 The addition of this control trivially increases the explanatory power of the model: the R
2 rises from 19% 
in column [a] to 87% after controlling for estimated costs. Page | 18  
 
 
5.2 Concorrência-only projects 
 
In 2007 and 2009, 29% of all projects in our sample were launched as concorrências 
(based on their estimated cost), but represented 92% of the almost R$3 billion in 
contracts awarded across both companies. As noted earlier, these projects are of special 
interest from a procurement efficiency perspective, due to their relatively higher 
procedural complexity. We thus repeat the above analyses for this subset of projects. In 
addition, this exercise allows us to indirectly explore the heterogeneity of the effects of 
the reform as a function of the economic scale of the underlying projects. 
 
Table 4’ studies the effect of the reform on the procurement process duration among 
these larger scale projects (which take on average 20 days longer to implement across 
both companies). Conditional on segment fixed effects and estimated project costs, 
concorrência events took 64 additional days to be carried out at SABESP relative to 
COPASA. Looking at column [c] we find a statistically insignificant but economically 
large impact—a 24-day reduction—of post-qualification on the duration of procurement 
processes.  
 
Table 5’ provides no statistically significant evidence that the reform affected the 
likelihood of complaints among concorrência projects, though the point estimate of the 
difference-in-differences marginal effect precisely matches the one observed for the full 
sample.  
 
Finally, Table 6’ reports the results of the difference-in-differences analysis on prices 
paid for concorrência projects. At baseline, such public works were R$22 million costlier 
at SABESP than at COPASA (column [a]), but this gap was more than offset by the 
procurement reform (which is associated with a change of -R$26 million). However, as in 
the pooled sample case, these differences are entirely accounted for once we control for 
estimated project costs, such that the estimates of β, γ, and δ are all indistinguishable 
from zero.  
 
These results emphasize a tradeoff between economic and statistical significance. 
When we restrict the analysis to concorrência projects, our estimates are often larger in 
magnitude; however the more limited number of observations does not grant enough 
power to identify the effects with generally-accepted precision levels. 
 
Our estimation methodology relies on a local identification strategy (i.e., in the 
neighborhood of the policy change) that enables us to estimate the parameter of interest 
without imposing structural assumptions beyond a minimal (semiparametric) linear 
specification. Given the limited amount of data, an alternative avenue would be to exploit 
more carefully the economic structure of the bidding problem to inform the estimating 
equation and improve the precision of our estimates (see for instance Athey and Haile, 
2006), thereby relaxing the data requirement imposed by semiparametric methods. 
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6.   Conclusions 
 
According to economic theory, the inversão das fases procedure adopted by SABESP 
in São Paulo state should have led to a faster procurement process, due to both a 
procedurally simpler process and a reduction in the number of decision complaints.  In 
addition, one should have expected that, if the introduction of the fase saneadora 
increased the number of competitive bids, then more competitive prices would also result 
from the reform. In order to test such theoretical predictions, we utilized a difference-in-
differences methodology that allowed us to isolate and quantify the impact of the reform 
on works procurement efficiency. 
 
While our results suggest that inversão das fases might have sped up the procurement 
process, mainly through the reduction in the number of complaint filings, the results we 
find are not statistically significant. This may well reflect the limited number of 
observations with which we worked, and we hope that in future new data will allow us, as 
it becomes available, to improve on the significance of our estimates and get a cleaner 
sense of the effects of the reform. 
 
Looking at the reform’s impact on the prices paid to winning bidders, we find no 
evidence of a reduction effect. However, such finding should be taken as very 
preliminary. The information available in our dataset allowed us to measure the reform’s 
impact on the size of the award, as opposed to the impact on actual fees ultimately paid to 
contractors from project inception through delivery (some projects can be highly prone to 
contract amendments during implementation, which may materially impact the fees 
charged by contractors). Since we have not (yet) been able to collect data on amendment 
requests during project execution, our conclusion on prices paid should be seen as an 
approximation to the impact of the reform on “true” (i.e., ultimately incurred) prices. 
  
We hope that new data will in future allow us to improve on the significance of our 
estimates. Nevertheless, even with the data limitations faced we believe this paper 
provides a useful contribution to the procurement literature by deriving testable 
implications from economic theory and applying a statistically-sound methodology to the 
evaluation of a particular procurement reform. 
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Unique ID assigned to each bidding process 
Works description  Summary description of the nature of the works procured 
 
Segment  Works projects are categorized by segment, based on 
activity type. There are 16 project segments, including 
water plants, water pipes, connections, and sewage plants 
 
Date of opening of the first 
envelope 
For 2007 (prior to the reform), the first envelope contains 
the technical, financial, legal, and fiscal qualification 
documents. For 2009 (post reform), the first envelope 
corresponds to the price proposal 
 
Contract signature date  Date contract was signed  
 
Estimated cost  Officially estimated project cost, as prepared by SABESP, 
in Brazilian currency 
 
Contract price  Actual size of the contract awarded as a result of the 
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SABESP Dataset 2:  









Unique ID assigned to each bidding process 
Process stage in which 
complaint was filed 
Four options:  
  Habilitação, or technical evaluation phase (where 
technical, financial, legal, and fiscal qualification 
documents are reviewed)  
  Price evaluation phase 
  Contract award 
  Contract signature 
 
 
Complaint filing date  Date complaint was received by SABESP or filed with 
TCU or a court of law 
 






Number of days elapsed until the complaint was resolved 
Type of complaint  Five possible types: 
  Administrative complaint against evaluation of 
technical bids 
  Administrative complaint against evaluation of 
prices 
  Lawsuit against evaluation of technical bids 
  Lawsuit against evaluation of prices 
  Lawsuit against contract award 
 
Reason for filing complaint  Optional field with open-ended description  
 










Unique ID assigned to each bidding process 
Procurement method  Concorrência or Tomada de Preços  
 
Estimated cost  Officially estimated project cost, as prepared by 
COPASA, in Brazilian currency 
 
Works description  Summary description of the nature of the works procured 
 
Date of opening the first 
envelope 
Date of opening the habilitação envelope, which contains 
the technical, financial, legal, and fiscal qualification 
documents 
 
Date of opening the second 
envelope 
 
Date of opening the envelope containing the bid price 
Contract signature date  Date contract was signed 
 
Contract price  In Brazilian currency 
 
Presence of procurement 
complaints 
Yes/No indicator of whether the procurement process was 










































































































































SP x Y2009 ‐12.80 ‐2.27 1.09
SE [8.53] [7.51] [6.62]
SP 41.91 31.83 31.52
SE [7.34]*** [6.40]*** [5.81]***
Y2009 ‐12.35 ‐11.31 ‐12.77
SE [2.23]*** [2.17]*** [1.97]***
Controlling for 
Method = Concorrência 34.36 20.43 12.51





R‐Squared 0.30 0.42 0.51
SP x Y2009 ‐13.78 ‐3.07 1.01
SE [8.64] [7.95] [6.96]
SP 41.33 32.18 32.06
SE [8.07]*** [7.45]*** [6.66]***
Y2009 ‐11.30 ‐10.85 ‐13.02
SE [2.33]*** [2.27]*** [2.06]***
Controlling for 
Method = Concorrência 33.51 20.80 13.42






























































Standarderrors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All prices are in real 2007 Reais.
Project segments are: Estacoes Elevatorias De Agua E/Ou Boosters; Estacoes De Tratamento De Agua;
Adutoras; Redes De Distribuicao De Agua; Estacoes Elevatorias De Esgotos; Estacoes De Tratamento De
Esgotos; Interceptores,Coletores E Emissario; Emissarios E Adutoras Subaquaticas; Redes Coletoras De
Esgotos; Reservatorios; Estruturas; Pocos Profundos; Instalacoes E Montagens Industriais; Instalacoes
Eletricas; Edificacoes; Ligacoes Prediais De Agua Em Redes; Ligacoes Prediais De Esgotos Em Red; Serviços








SP x Y2009 ‐0.11 ‐0.08 ‐0.06
SE [0.05]** [0.03]*** [0.03]*
SP 0.04 0.04 0.01
SE [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Y2009 0.03 0.03 0.03
SE [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Controlling for 
Method = Concorrência 0.22 0.23 0.19




SP x Y2009 ‐0.13 ‐0.09 ‐0.07
SE [0.05]** [0.02]*** [0.03]**
SP 0.04 0.03 ‐0.01
SE [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Y2009 0.04 0.04 0.04
SE [0.03] [0.03]* [0.03]*
Controlling for 
Method = Concorrência 0.21 0.22 0.17




























































Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All prices are in real 2007
Reais.
P r o j e c ts e g me n t sa r e :E s t a c o e sE l e v a t or i a sD eA g u aE / O uB o o s t e r s ;E s t a c o e s
De Tratamento De Agua; Adutoras; Redes De Distribuicao De Agua;
Estacoes Elevatorias De Esgotos; Estacoes De Tratamento De Esgotos;
Interceptores,Coletores E Emissario; Emissarios E Adutoras Subaquaticas;
Redes Coletoras De Esgotos; Reservatorios; Estruturas; Pocos Profundos;
Instalacoes E Montagens Industriais; Instalacoes Eletricas; Edificacoes;
Ligacoes Prediais De Agua Em Redes; Ligacoes Prediais De Esgotos Em
Red; Serviços Operacionais; Sistema De Abastecimento De Água; Solid



















































[a] [b] [c] [d] [e]
SP x Y2009 ‐7,582,793 169,233 126,851 59,171 ‐8,875,933
SE [2,997,175.32]** [191,957.29] [195,993.42] [231,247.56] [3,377,986.15]***
SP 6,969,528 ‐445,275 ‐441,369 ‐367,726 8,489,817
SE [2,648,186.70]*** [149,306.26]*** [148,653.01]*** [191,513.07]* [2,945,457.41]***
Y2009 ‐559,298 203,413 221,799 151,038 ‐873,290
SE [556,526.66] [75,017.63]*** [84,594.83]*** [116,582.21] [648,563.89]
Controlling for 
Method = Concorrência 10,453,008 204,010 303,717 92,506 11,734,920
SE [1,519,327.82]*** [357,051.87] [306,001.38] [213,895.50] [1,684,156.11]***
Estimated Project Cost 0.8700 0.8800 0.8700





R‐Squared 0.19 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.20
SP x Y2009 ‐8,011,744 432 ‐33,868 ‐184,018 ‐9,394,133
SE [2,721,245.07]*** [180,148.42] [197,333.44] [191,155.56] [3,189,452.87]***
SP 6,442,655 ‐412,898 ‐411,918 ‐261,240 8,038,014
SE [2,452,810.50]*** [196,596.51]** [196,651.24]** [190,167.30] [2,906,629.42]***
Y2009 ‐125,426 217,023 235,255 114,469 ‐401,515
SE [578,113.73] [83,330.16]*** [88,981.07]*** [98,700.43] [670,474.73]
Controlling for 
Method = Concorrência 9,940,616 420,086 482,079 250,346 11,162,650
SE [1,248,077.58]*** [280,643.11] [260,705.23]* [167,661.19] [1,422,765.60]***
Estimated Project Cost 0.8500 0.8500 0.8400
































































Standarderrors arerobust to heteroskedasticity. All prices are in real 2007Reais.
Project segments are: Estacoes Elevatorias De Agua E/Ou Boosters; Estacoes De Tratamento De Agua; Adutoras; Redes De
Distribuicao De Agua; Estacoes Elevatorias De Esgotos; Estacoes De Tratamento De Esgotos; Interceptores, Coletores E
Emissario; Emissarios E Adutoras Subaquaticas; Redes Coletoras De Esgotos; Reservatorios; Estruturas; Pocos Profundos;
Instalacoes E Montagens Industriais; Instalacoes Eletricas; Edificacoes; Ligacoes Prediais De Agua Em Redes; Ligacoes





















































[a] [b] [c] [d] [e]
SP x Y2009
Centile 0.05 16,038 9,118 11,025 ‐225,499 47,351
SE [33,644.8483] [123,469.3026] [97,736.4472] [183,517.3332] [40,235.6085]
Centile 0.10 37,007 64,298 64,298 ‐183,387 36,161
SE [32,707.1721] [89,196.4735] [198,255.5740] [165,620.1234] [36,397.9547]
Centile 0.50 ‐7,546 ‐41,541 ‐37,470 ‐70,946 ‐9,551
SE [602,185.7025] [42,081.0636] [422,170.9901] [39,724.3680]* [546,609.2781]
Centile 0.90 ‐677,436 ‐163 ‐477 2,031 ‐536,544
SE [1.4144e+07] [2,065.9986] [24,898.7455] [5,316.4451] [1.8584e+07]
Centile 0.95 ‐50,470,000 309 878 1,616 ‐61,911,000
SE [2.2893e+07]** [6,311.0326] [5,123.2546] [166,291.1770] [3.1528e+07]**
SP
Centile 0.05 94,253 ‐61,669 ‐63,577 ‐22,110 87,899
SE [27,252.2957]*** [145,439.0074] [121,842.3936] [157,465.8044] [35,113.5865]**
Centile 0.10 67,551 ‐119,953 ‐119,953 ‐23,030 91,750
SE [25,706.8455]*** [97,253.4293] [271,897.7542] [140,993.2751] [29,530.4023]***
Centile 0.50 94,434 ‐12,619 ‐15,524 1,362 140,667
SE [533,217.4946] [24,292.8443] [29,345.0822] [25,897.2575] [498,921.7517]
Centile 0.90 852,684 167 168 ‐158 805,837
SE [1.3404e+07] [1,887.8885] [35,406.6883] [4,653.8237] [1.8553e+07]
Centile 0.95 50,555,000 72 ‐877 119 62,207,000
SE [2.2639e+07]** [1,468.9709] [31,711.1151] [2,286.5566] [3.1444e+07]**
Y2009
Centile 0.05 3,091 357 424 ‐26,253 ‐7,535
SE [18,416.4402] [44,628.8521] [30,524.9694] [136,978.1999] [22,081.8965]
Centile 0.10 ‐15,038 3,302 3,302 ‐26,315 ‐14,256
SE [15,533.3010] [16,865.2635] [130,487.9669] [29,509.3426] [19,772.0017]
Centile 0.50 11,660 23,564 23,949 ‐26,431 14,588
SE [460,146.3061] [9,393.9253]** [22,452.7984] [32,088.9581] [392,503.3660]
Centile 0.90 ‐6,180 1,149 1,464 2,751 ‐121,028
SE [3372960.4144] [1,260.5456] [10,555.2057] [10,394.6897] [1282742.0122]
Centile 0.95 ‐78,829 258 283 934 ‐175,516
SE [3388879.2793] [793.5123] [6,265.3587] [5,400.2453] [388,787.7879]
Controls for 
Method = Concorrência XXXX X
Estimated Project C o s t XXX
Complaint Indicator X
Y2009 x Estimated Project Cost X




















































SP x Y2009 ‐57.82 ‐27.74 ‐23.63
SE [25.79]** [23.04] [21.33]
SP 91.31 64.17 66.78
SE [25.2]*** [22.48]*** [20.35]***
Y2009 ‐3.90 ‐8.41 ‐9.53


































Standarderrors arerobust to heteroskedasticity. All prices are in real 2007Reais.
Project segments are: Estacoes Elevatorias De Agua E/Ou Boosters; Estacoes De Tratamento De Agua;
Adutoras; Redes De Distribuicao De Agua; Estacoes Elevatorias De Esgotos; Estacoes De Tratamento De
Esgotos; Interceptores,Coletores E Emissario; Emissarios E Adutoras Subaquaticas; Redes Coletoras De
Esgotos; Reservatorios; Estruturas; Pocos Profundos; Instalacoes E Montagens Industriais; Instalacoes
Eletricas; Edificacoes; Ligacoes Prediais De Agua Em Redes; Ligacoes Prediais De Esgotos Em Red; Serviços


















































[a] [b] [a] [b]
SP x Y2009 ‐0.24 ‐0.08 ‐0.23 ‐0.07
SE [0.14]* [0.15] [0.11]** [0.15]
SP 0.10 ‐0.05 0.08 ‐0.08
SE [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.14]
Y2009 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03
































Standarderrors arerobust to heteroskedasticity. All prices are in real 2007Reais.
Project segments are: Estacoes Elevatorias De Agua E/Ou Boosters; Estacoes De Tratamento De
Agua; Adutoras; Redes De Distribuicao De Agua; Estacoes Elevatorias De Esgotos; Estacoes De
Tratamento De Esgotos; Interceptores,Coletores E Emissario; Emissarios E Adutoras Subaquaticas;
Redes Coletoras De Esgotos; Reservatorios; Estruturas; Pocos Profundos; Instalacoes E Montagens
Industriais; Instalacoes Eletricas; Edificacoes; Ligacoes Prediais De Agua Em Redes; Ligacoes
Prediais De Esgotos Em Red; Serviços Operacionais; Sistema De Abastecimento De Água; Solid












































[a] [b] [c] [d] [e]
SP x Y2009 ‐26,138,300 ‐29,248 ‐32,901 ‐843,007 ‐31,432,900
SE [9,102,990]*** [947,979] [984,223] [1,004,790] [10,334,700]***
SP 22,474,000 ‐1,090,610 ‐1,092,930 ‐123,336 28,369,600
SE [8,963,950]** [920,408] [901,123] [951,106] [10,327,800]***
Y2009 4,981,630 1,068,920 1,069,920 274,993 4,710,530
SE [2,699,280]* [542,832]** [546,878]* [601,514] [2,863,480]*
Controlling for 
Estimated Project Cost 0.83 0.83 0.81

































Standarderrors arerobust to heteroskedasticity. All prices are in real 2007Reais.
Project segments are:Estacoes Elevatorias De Agua E/Ou Boosters;Estacoes DeTratamento De Agua; Adutoras;Redes De
Distribuicao De Agua; Estacoes Elevatorias De Esgotos; Estacoes De Tratamento De Esgotos; Interceptores,Coletores E
Emissario; Emissarios E Adutoras Subaquaticas; Redes Coletoras De Esgotos; Reservatorios; Estruturas; Pocos Profundos;
Instalacoes E Montagens Industriais; Instalacoes Eletricas; Edificacoes; Ligacoes Prediais De Agua Em Redes; Ligacoes
PrediaisDe Esgotos Em Red; Serviços Operacionais; Sistema De Abastecimento De Água; Solid Waste Facility.